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ARGUMENT
I.

THE IMPROPER COMMENTS OF THE PROSECUTOR REQUIRE REVERSAL.
A.

The Prosecutor's Emphasis Of Dunn's Request For An
Attorney Requires Reversal.

Improper comments by a prosecutor require reversal when the
record shows that the jury was sufficiently likely to be
influenced by the remarks "to undermine confidence in the verdict."

State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106, 1112 (Utah 1985); State v.

Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987).
The State suggests that the prosecutor's reference in his
closing argument to Mr. Dunn's request for a lawyer was completely proper because Mr. Dunn was not yet in custody and had
not yet been charged with a crime.
In fact, although Mr. Dunn had not yet been read his Miranda
rights, the evidence shows that he was in police custody at the
time he asked for a lawyer.

After the motorhome was stopped by

police, one officer asked Mr. Dunn and Mr. Scott to step out of
the car.

P. 236.

While one officer searched the motorhome,

another officer was guarding Mr. Dunn and Mr. Scott with a sawedoff shotgun.

P. 235. Mr. Dunn's request for an attorney was in

response to a question from the officer regarding the dead body.
Immediately after the request for an attorney, both Mr. Dunn and
Mr. Scott were subjected to a pat-down search and handcuffed.
240.

P.

The police had just discovered Mr. Sprinkle's dead body in

1
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the motorhome Mr. Dunn was driving.

Mr. Dunn was on the verge of

|

arrest even if he had not officially been taken into custody.
The State cites to Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 685
(

(1988) and Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972) for the
proposition that no Fifth or Sixth Amendment concerns attach to
any precustodial activity.

The State is wrong.

In fact, the
(

Court in Kirby explicitly states:
[w]hat has been said is not to suggest that
there may not be occasions during the course
of a criminal investigation when the police
do abuse identification procedures. Such
abuses are not beyond the reach of the constitution. As the Court pointed out in Wade
itself, it is always necessary to "scrutinize" any pretrial confrontation.
406 U.S. at 690-91 (emphasis in original).

{

Further, the Court in
A

Kirby specifically noted that the defendant had not requested an
attorney at the time of the investigatory lineup which was the
subject of the dispute in that case.

Thus, the State's conten1

tion that no constitutional concerns are invoked by precustodial
activity is incorrect.

In this case, Mr. Dunn had been stopped

by the police, he was being held at gunpoint by one officer and
i

another officer had just discovered Mr. Sprinkle's dead body in
the motorhome Mr. Dunn was driving. He was in custody even if he
had not yet been read his Miranda rights.
.

•

Roberson dealt with the suppression of evidence, not with
the propriety of a prosecutor's attempt to associate a request
for an attorney with a defendant's guilt or innocence.

2
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Roberson

.

•

•

.

(

does not stand for the proposition that a prosecutor may use a
precustodial request for counsel to imply a defendant's guilt.
While it may be permissible for a prosecutor to comment on a
defendant's exercise of a constitutional right when intended to
rebut or impeach a claim made by the defendant, in this case, the
State went far beyond that.

The State now claims the prosecutor

was attempting to prove Mr. Dunn's state of mind at the time of
his arrest.

In closing argument, the prosecutor's version of the

arrest scene was:
Officer Larson found the body and walked up
to him and said, "What can you tell me about
the body back there?" What does Mr. Dunn
say? "I want a lawyer. I want a lawyer." Is
that a scared man? Is that a man that's so
frightened of Howard Scott that he doesn't
know what to do or how to get away? "I want
a lawyer."
In fact, Officer Larson testified that he asked Mr. Dunn,
"What can you tell me about the guy in the motorhome?" and that
Mr. Dunn replied, "I want a lawyer.
drive."

All I was told to do was

T. 269-270.

Compared to Mr. Dunn's actual comments, the excerpt chosen
by the prosecutor demonstrates that the State's intent was to
convey more than Mr. Dunn's state of mind.

The prosecutor re-

peated Mr. Dunn's request for counsel three times but failed to
repeat the rest of Mr. Dunn's statement.

In fact, the request

for counsel on its own is inaccurate in the impression it conveys
about Mr. Dunn's state of mind at the time of the arrest.

3
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The

I

addition of his exculpatory statement, "All I was told to do was
drive" puts the exchange in a different light.

The prosecutor

used the excuse of impeachment to push the jury toward the improper conclusion that a guilty man would not ask for a lawyer.
Further, two of the cases cited by the State deal with the
admission of evidence, not with its use in a closing argument.
In State v. Sorrels, 642 P.2d 373, 375 (Utah 1982), this Court
found no error in cross examination by a prosecutor who forced
the defendant to admit he had an opportunity to tell his story to
the police but failed to do so.

This followed testimony by the

defendant that, "I haven't had a chance to say anything before to
try and prove my innocence." Id.

Similarly, in Fletcher v. Weir,

455 U.S. 603 (1982), the United States Supreme Court found proper
cross examination of a defendant in a murder trial who testified
that he stabbed the victim in self-defense.

The prosecutor
{

cross-examined the defendant as to why he never told the arresting officers this story.

^d. at 604. Again, the prosecu-

tor's comments here went much farther.

Unlike the cases cited,

the prosecutor in this case repeated Mr. Dunn's request for a
lawyer three times and failed to accurately present the request
in context.

Whether or not Mr. Dunn's statement should have been

admitted, it was constitutionally improper for his request for
counsel to be emphasized by the prosecutor in the manner that
occurred here.
'"•

•

•

v

:

• '

.

-

. • ' , '

•

" . ' . „ '

4
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• " '

' . . . ' • :

•-..,

..

•

^ .

:

;

l

B.

Prosecutorial Reference To Factors Outside The
Evidence Requires Reversal.

At the start of his closing argument, the prosecutor
improperly suggested that the jury's concern for the well-being
of society should override their obligation to acquit Mr. Dunn i
they had a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

While defense

counsel failed to object, the argument constituted plain error
and is sufficient to mandate reversal by this Court.
The State mischaracterizes the nature of the comments made
by the prosecutor in his closing arguments.

The prosecutor did

not simply ask the jury to convict for the good of the community
or fairness to society.

Rather the prosecutor said, "Make sure

before you determine that there is reasonable doubt, make sure
that before you elevate some of the concerns to the point of a
reasonable doubt, that you are being fair to the most important
segment of society at large."

T. 549. Unlike the arguments in

the cases cited by the State, the prosecutor here specifically
suggested that concern for society should override the jury's
obligation not to convict if they had a reasonable doubt about
Mr. Dunn's guilt.

The prosecutor's comments were improper.

This Court may take "notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention
of the court."

Utah R. Evid. 103(d).

The plain error standard

requires the reviewing court to make two findings:
First, the error must be "plain" or "manifest." This is sometimes termed an "obvi5'
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

ousness" requirement. After examining the
record, an appellate court must be able to
say "that it should have been obvious to a
trial court that it was committing error."
Second, the error must be of sufficient magnitude that it affects the substantial rights
of a party. In other words . . . the appellant must show a reasonable likelihood that
absent the error, the outcome below would
have been more favorable.
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989) (citations and
footnotes omitted).

Both elements are present here.

cutor's remarks were clearly erroneous:

The prose-

the jury should have

been limited in its deliberations to evidence presented at trial,
State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 403 (Utah 1986); and, the jury
had an obligation to acquit Mr. Dunn if it had a reasonable doubt
as to his guilt. Id.1
Contrary to the State's unsupported assertion, this improper
argument likely had an impact on the jury.

Mr. Dunn was con-

victed based largely on circumstantial evidence.

As this Court

noted in Andreason, "When the evidence in the record is circumstantial or sufficiently conflicting, jurors are more likely
influenced by an improper argument.

In such instances, they are

more susceptible to the suggestion that factors other than the
evidence before them should determine a defendant's guilt or
innocence."

Id. at 403.

Thus, a suggestion that the jury should

1

The failure of defense counsel to object further demonstrates the ineffective assistance of counsel during the trial.
See Point VI of Opening Brief of Appellant.

6
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(

consider factors outside the evidence may have contributed
heavily to the jury's decision to convict Mr. Dunn. Other than
the inherently incredible testimony by Scott, the admitted triggerman, see pp. 23-27, infra, there was no direct evidence that
Mr. Dunn participated in the crime.

As a result, the improper

argument by the prosecutor was more likely than not an influence
on the jury's decision.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S REVERSAL OF ITS PRETRIAL RULING EXCLUDING
MR. DUNN'S PRIOR CONVICTION WAS UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL AND
REQUIRES REVERSAL.
In response to Mr. Dunn's contention that the trial court

improperly admitted evidence of his prior felony conviction, the
State argues that the conviction was admissible under the law
then in effect.

This argument misses the point.

The record

shows that the district court ruled before trial that the conviction would not be received except for purposes of impeaching
character evidence.

The court's admission of the conviction,

after Mr. Dunn took the witness stand without adducing character
evidence in reliance on that pretrial ruling, was improper and
unfairly prejudicial to Mr. Dunn.
In its brief, the State quotes only a small portion of the
court's lengthy pretrial discussion of Mr. Dunn's motion to
exclude the conviction.

From a reading of all of the relevant

portions of the trial transcript, however, it is clear that
before trial the court ruled the conviction inadmissible except

7
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i

for purposes of impeaching character evidence, but reversed that
ruling after Mr. Dunn had already taken the stand in reliance on
the pretrial ruling.2
Before trial the court considered the conviction presumptively inadmissible.

The following exchange between defense

counsel and the court is particularly revealing:
THE COURT: I kind of hate to -- if he [the
prosecutor] just brings it in and wants to
put on the evidence/ boom — of this prior
conviction, Iym not going to allow it because
I don't think it's admissible and I think our
rules say that it is not admissible, but in
the alternative, if your client gets on the
stand and you paint him as a character without blemish, you see what I mean, and it gets
into that, then I think the prosecution has a
right to go into it and I think he has the
right. But what Ifm really saying is that I
can't really rule on that until I get to the
posture of the case where it comes out, but
if he's attempting to use it as evidence of
the commission of this crime, I'm not going
to allow.
Now, do you follow what I'm saying?
MR. TAYLOR: I think I do, Your Honor, and I
do agree with the Court that that conviction
can come in through cross-examination or
rebuttal as to defeat, or impeach or rebut in
character, as evidence, if the Defendant
presents it.
THE COURT: That's right. So, I don't see
where we've got a problem. Am I wrong?
MR. TAYLOR: But other than that, I think the
Court should rule that it is inadmissible.
2

A copy of the transcript of the entire pretrial hearing on
the motion to exclude and of the related hearing that occurred
after Mr. Dunn testified is attached to this Brief as Addendum A.

8
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THE COURT:
it?

That's what I think I said; isn't

T. 236-237 (emphasis added).

Later, when the prosecutor sought

to introduce evidence of the conviction on cross-examination of
Mr. Dunn, defense counsel reiterated his understanding of the
Court's pretrial ruling, stating, "Well, the Court ruled at the
beginning of the trial that it can come in if it's in rebuttal of
character evidence.
dence."

T. 444.

We haven't presented any character evi-

Nevertheless, the court received evidence of

the conviction.
The State apparently contends that the court's pretrial
ruling went no further than to exclude the conviction from the
prosecutor's case-in-chief.

While the court did state it would

not rule in advance on the admissibility of the conviction after
the State had presented its case-in-chief, that remark must be
viewed in light of the discussion that immediately preceded it,
quoted above, in which defense counsel sought clarification of
the court's ruling and the court confirmed that the conviction
was not admissible except to impeach character evidence.

The

court's statement reserving its ultimate ruling on the admissibility of the conviction merely reflects the fact that the
court could not determine whether Mr. Dunn had placed his character in issue until after Mr. Dunn had testified.

9
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That the court initially held the conviction inadmissible
except to impeach character evidence is further demonstrated by
the court's discussion of the relevant law.

Before trial, the

court appears to have relied exclusively on Utah R. Evid. 55 and
federal cases interpreting the corresponding Fed. R. Evid.
609(a)3 under which the conviction would have been excluded
unless its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect.
United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 359-69 (D.C. Cir. 1976).4
During argument on the motion before trial, the court referred

3

Fed. R. Evid. 609(a) states:
For the purposes of attacking the credibility
of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if
elicited from him or established by public
record during cross-examination but only if
the crime (1) was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under the
law under which he was convicted, and the
court determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2)
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.

4

In so doing, the court was merely a few years ahead of its
time. In 1983, in recognition of the overwhelming risk that a jury
will improperly consider a prior conviction as evidence of guilt
of the later charge, the Utah rule was modified to agree with the
federal rule. Utah R. Evid. 609(a); State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325
(Utah 1986). Under current Utah law, Mr. Dunn's prior conviction
clearly should have been excluded. The prior conviction occurred
in 1973 and was for the crime of assault with a deadly weapon
arising from the abduction of a young woman. Given the remoteness
of the offense and its similarity to the kidnapping charge at
issue, it would have been reversible error to admit the conviction.
Banner, 717 P.2d at 1335.
10
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only to "Rule 55"5 (T. 235, lines 6-17) and the "United States
cases" (T. 235, line 30 -T. 236, line 6).

No mention was made by

either the court or counsel of Utah R. Evid. 21, Utah Code Ann. §
78-24-9 (1977) or State v. Bennett, 517 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1973),
cert, denied, 416 U.S. 992 (1974), under which the conviction may
have been admissible.

T. 234-38.

Only after Mr. Dunn testified

did the prosecutor cite State v. Bennett to the court.

It was on

that basis that the court reversed its pretrial ruling and received the conviction without requiring that it rebut character
evidence.

T. 444-45.

Thus, even assuming that the court could

properly have ruled the conviction admissible before trial, the
fact of the matter is that it did not.
Admission of the conviction after Mr. Dunn had already taken
the stand in reliance upon the court's express assurance that the
conviction would be excluded unless he placed his character in
issue was unfairly prejudicial to Mr. Dunn.

Mr. Dunn had the

right to remain silent and, had he done so, evidence of the prior

5

Utah R. Evid. 55, which was repealed in 1983, stated as
follows:
Subject to Rule 47, evidence that a person committed
a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is
inadmissible to prove his disposition to commit crime or
civil wrong as the basis for an inference that he
committed another crime or civil wrong on another
specified occasion but, subject to Rules 45 and 48, such
evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some other
material fact including absence of mistake or accident,
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge
or identity.
11
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<

conviction would not have been presented to the jury.

Defense

(

counsel sought a pretrial ruling on admissibility of the conviction to be able to weigh the risk <pf not having Mr, Dunn testify
against the risk of having the conviction admitted.

Had he known

(

the conviction would be received, Mr. Dunn could have chosen to
exercise his right not to testify, or, at a minimum, attempted to
explain the circumstances of the conviction during direct

4

examination thereby blunting the impact on the jury of the crossexamination on the conviction.
The court compounded the prejudice to Mr. Dunn by also

<

erroneously allowing, over defense counsel's objection, crossexamination not only as to the fact of the conviction and the
name of the crime, but also as to the circumstances surrounding
the crime.

T. 446.

i

Even under the then existing law, such

cross-examination was improper.

State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266,

269, 382 P.2d 407, 409 (1963); Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile

(

Inst., 605 P.2d 314, 326 n. 14 (Utah 1979), overruled on other
grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Co., 678 P.2d 298 (1984).
conviction in question - assault with a deadly weapon —
from the abduction of a young woman.

T. 447.

The prior
stemmed

<

Thus, it was

highly similar to the kidnapping charge at issue and particularly
V <

'
12
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i

susceptible of being used to inflame the jury and to support an
improper inference of guilt on the kidnapping charge.6
The similarity of a prior conviction to the crime charged is
extremely prejudicial and the improper admission of such a conviction is reversible error.
1335 (Utah 1986).7

State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325,

This Court should reverse Mr. Dunn's convic-

tion and grant a new trial.
III. THE CHARGE OF RECKLESS MANSLAUGHTER IS INAPPROPRIATE UNDER
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, REGARDLESS OF THE GROUND ON WHICH
DUNN'S SECOND DEGREE MURDER CONVICTION IS REVERSED.
A.

The Charge Of Reckless Manslaughter Is Inappropriate Under The Facts Of This Case.

The State confesses error in Dunn's conviction for second
degree murder, albeit on different grounds from those raised by
Dunn.

State's Br. at 24-29.

The State correctly points out that

the instruction given to the jury on second degree murder was
erroneous because it improperly included the term "recklessly" in
the definition of "depraved indifference" murder.

The State

further concedes that the incorrect instruction constituted plain
error which cannot be considered harmless because the evidence
against Dunn was not overwhelming.

State's Br. at 28-29.

In

6

No limiting instruction was given to the jury concerning the
prior conviction. T. 531-548.
7

Although Banner was decided under the current rules of
evidence, the principle for which it is cited here, i.e., that the
improper admission of a prior conviction similar to the crime
charged is reversible error, is validly applied to the admission
of such a conviction that was erroneous under prior law.
13
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raising yet another serious defect in the trial, the State lends
convincing support to Dunn's basic contention that the proceedings against him were so replete with error that his convictions must be reversed.
In an attempt to salvage a homicide conviction out of those
flawed proceedings, the State now requests this Court to enter a
conviction against Dunn for reckless manslaughter.8

The State

expressly concedes, however, that the evidence in support of
Dunn's second degree murder conviction is "not overwhelming."
Id.

Since double jeopardy principles do not bar a retrial where

a conviction is reversed for trial error rather than insufficiency of the evidence, the usual procedure where a conviction is
reversed for an erroneous jury instruction is to grant a new
trial.

Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978); Greene v.

Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978).

Thus, in seeking a conviction on the

lesser offense of reckless manslaughter rather than a new trial
on the second degree murder charge, the State impliedly admits

8

The State attempts to avoid consideration of the merits of
thi issue by contending that Mr. Dunn has waived any challenge to
a manslaughter conviction. Inasmuch as Mr. Dunn was not convicted
of manslaughter, he certainly cannot have waived a challenge to
such a conviction. The manslaughter issue is a new matter raised
by the State and is, as such, properly addressed in this Reply
Brief. See, Utah R. App. P. 24(c).
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that the evidence against Dunn is indeed insufficient to support
his conviction.9
Where a conviction is reversed on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence, this Court may enter a conviction for a
lesser included offense only if the requirements of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (1990) are satisfied.

That section reads:

If the district court on motion after
verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on
appeal or certiorari, shall determine that
there is insufficient evidence to support a
conviction for the offense charged but that
there is sufficient evidence to support a
conviction for an included offense and the
trier of fact necessarily found every fact
required for conviction of that included
offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for the included
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if
such relief is sought by the defendant.
Dunn has not sought the alternative relief of a reckless
manslaughter conviction.10

Thus, Section 76-1-402(5) is inap-

plicable here.

9

As discussed at p. 21, infra, the insufficiency in the
evidence is on the issue of Dunn's mens rea. Therefore, this
admission logically also applies to the aggravated kidnapping
conviction, despite the State's argument that the evidence was
sufficient to support the conviction on that offense.
10

In State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1989), this Court
found the requirement that the defendant seek the relief of a
conviction on a lesser included offense to be met by the defendant's request for a jury instruction on that offense. Id. at
1219, n.20. Here, Dunn did not request an instruction on reckless
manslaughter.
See, Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions
included in the Supplemental Record on this appeal.
15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Moreover, as shown below, the charge of reckless manslaughter is fundamentally inconsistent with both the evidence
and the prosecution's own theory of the case at trial.

Thus, if

this Court finds the evidence insufficient to support Dunn's
second degree murder conviction, the appropriate remedy is reversal.

Even if, despite the State's admission, this Court

should reverse the conviction solely on the ground of the
erroneous jury instruction, the appropriate remedy would be to
grant a new trial.
Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(l)(a) (1978), one is guilty
of reckless manslaughter if he or she "recklessly causes the
death of another."

Section 76-2-103(3) (1978) provides that a

person acts recklessly:
when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the circumstances exist or the result
will occur. The risk must be of such nature
and degree that its disregard constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would exercise under
all the circumstances as viewed from the
actor's standpoint.
To convict Dunn of reckless manslaughter based upon his own
conduct, Dunn must have (1) committed a reckless act which (2)
caused the death of Sprinkle.

The evidence was undisputed,

however, that Sprinkle died, not from any act of Dunn, but only
from the acts of Scott.

Certainly, none of the acts the State

alleged Dunn committed in aid of the homicide —

i.e., driving

the motorhome and, according to Scott's testimony only, assisting
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Scott in tying up Sprinkle and telling Scott to shoot Sprinkle —
caused Sprinkle's death.

Rather, both the defense and prosecu-

tion agreed that Howard Scott intentionally shot and killed
Sprinkle.

Thus, Dunn cannot be convicted of reckless man-

slaughter based upon his own conduct alone, however reckless it
may have been.
This Court has repeatedly held that a manslaughter instruction is inappropriate where the defendants theory of the case
was that the defendant himself did not cause the victim's death.
See, e.g., State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 534 (Utah 1983) (manslaughter instruction not required where defendants sought
acquittal on second degree murder charge on basis of failure to
prove that they caused the victim's death); State v. Shabata, 678
P.2d 785, 790 (Utah 1984) (manslaughter conviction inappropriate
where defense is that defendant did not kill victim); see also
State v. Pendergrass, 803 P.2d 1261, 1264 (Utah App. 1990) (where
defendant testified that someone else shot victim, there was no
rational basis in the evidence for reckless manslaughter charge).
Here, as in Crick and Shabata, it was the defense theory that
Dunn himself did not engage in any act that caused Sprinkle's
death.

More importantly, however, this was the prosecution's

theory as well.
as an accomplice.

The prosecution contended Dunn was liable only
Thus, there was no rational basis in the
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evidence for a reckless manslaughter charge against Dunn based
upon his own conduct alone.
Neither can Dunn be convicted of reckless manslaughter as an
accomplice.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1990), defines an

accomplice as:
[a] person, acting with the mental state
required for the commission of an offense . .
., who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to
engage in conduct which constitutes an
offense.
Under section 76-2-202, "the test for determining whether a
person is an accomplice to a crime is whether the person could be
charged with the same crime as the [principal]."
added.)

(Emphasis

See State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1219-20 (Utah

1986); State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052, 1055 (Utah 1985); State v.
Cornish, 560 P.2d 1134, 1136 (Utah 1977).

Here, the crime com-

mitted by Howard Scott was an intentional homicide.

Thus, to be

guilty as an accomplice, Dunn must have acted with a mental state
that would subject him to liability for that crime, i.e., intent
to cause death or serious bodily harm.

A merely reckless state

of mind does not suffice.
Indeed, the words "solicits, requests, commands, encourages,
or intentionally aids" contained in section 76-2-202 imply that
an intent to bring about the criminal result is always an
essential element of accomplice liability.

Interpreting a

similar federal provision and its predecessors, Judge Learned
18
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Hand reached this conclusion in United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d
401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938):
It will be observed that all these definitions have nothing whatever to do with the
probability that the forbidden result would
follow upon the accessory's conduct; and that
they all demand that he in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something he wishes to
bring about, that he seek by his action to
make it succeed. All the words used - even
the most colorless, "abet" - carry an implication of purposive attitude towards it.
Thus, the Second Circuit in Peoni reversed a conviction for
possession of counterfeit money where the evidence showed that
the alleged accomplice merely knew, rather than intended, that
the money was likely to be resold to (and thus unlawfully possessed by) the principal.

See also Tarnef v. State, 512 P.2d 923

(Alaska 1973) (criminal intent is required element of aiding and
abetting arson); State v. Schriner, 215 Kan. 86, 523 P.2d 703
(1984) (conviction reversed where jury instructions failed to
indicate that defendant must share intent to kidnap); In re
Wilson, 91 Wash.2d 487, 588 P.2d 1161 (1979) (conviction of
juvenile reversed where lower court failed to find intentional
participation in criminal acts).

.

Similarly, in People v. Beeman, 35 Cal.3d 547, 199 Cal.
Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318 (1984), the court reversed a conviction
for robbery where the defendant had assisted others with knowledge that they intended to rob jewelry from his aunt.
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After

discussing prior California law, the court stated:
Thus, we conclude that the weight of authority and sound law require proof that an
aider and abettor act with knowledge of the
criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with
an intent or purpose either of committing, or
of encouraging or facilitating commission of,
the offense.
Id. at 1325 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
ing, the court stated:

Continu-

v

When the definition of the offense includes the intent to do some act or achieve
some consequence beyond the actus reus of the
crime, the aider and abettor must share the
specific intent of the perpetrator. By
"share" we mean neither that the aider and
abettor must be prepared to commit the
offense by his or her own act should the
perpetrator fail to do so, nor that the aider
and abettor must seek to share the fruits of
the crime. Rather, an aider and abettor will
"share" the perpetrator's specific intent
when he or she knows the full extent of the
perpetrator's criminal purpose and gives aid
or encouragement with the intent or purpose
of facilitating the perpetrator's commission
of the crime.
Id. at 1326 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Where as in

this case the underlying offense is an intentional murder, an
accomplice must share that intent.11

Thus, Mr. Dunn cannot be

n

In deciding this case, this Court need not reach the issue
of whether accomplice liability may ever be based on a mental state
less culpable than an intent to cause the result. While in some
jurisdictions, such liability is precluded altogether, see, e.g.,
State v. Etzweiler, 125 N.H. 57, 480 A.2d 870 (1984) (no liability
as an accomplice for negligent homicide), where such liability has
been imposed, the principal was also negligent or reckless. See,
e.g., Missouri v. Fennewald, 339 S.W.2d 769 (Mo. 1960) (accomplice
liability appropriate where defendant participated in high speed
auto race on public street and resulting collision involving other
20
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convicted of reckless manslaughter as an accomplice of Mr. Scott,
an intentional killer.
B.

The Evidence Is Insufficient To Support A Conviction For Either Second Degree Murder Or Reckless
Manslaughter.

Even if a reckless manslaughter charge were theoretically
applicable to this case, the evidence would be just as deficient
to support a verdict on that charge as on the second degree
murder charge.

When all is said and done, the State must rely

heavily on the testimony of Howard Scott to support a conviction
on any criminal charge against Dunn.

But for Scott's testimony,

the State lacked any substantial evidence of Dunn's mens rea,
whether it be the intent necessary to support a second degree
murder conviction, or the mere recklessness required for manslaughter.
As conceded by the State, the dispute at trial "was not as
to the circumstances and causes of Mr. Sprinkle's death, but with
what state of mind defendant had participated."
33.

State's Br. at

Aside from the testimony of Howard Scott, the only "par-

ticipation" of Dunn established by the prosecution from which
Dunn's mental state could be inferred by the jury was his driving

driver kills innocent motorist); State v. Pitts, 84 Mich. App. 656,
270 N.W.2d 482 (1978) (defendant liable where fellow participant
in neighborhood fight negligently discharged firearm resulting in
death of neighbor). Thus, accomplice liability may not be based
upon a lesser mental state than that required to convict the
principal. See, e.g., LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law, § 6.7(e) at
p. 585 (2d ed. 1986).
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the motorhome•

It was undisputed that it was Scott -- and only

Scott -- who had actually bound, beaten and shot Mr. Sprinkle,
The State argues that a conviction may not be overturned
merely because the jury chose to disbelieve the defendant.

Dunn,

however, does not rely upon his own testimony to challenge his
convictions.

As discussed at Point VI B of Dunn's opening Brief

and of this Reply Brief, it was the State's burden to disprove
Dunn's defense of compulsion beyond a reasonable doubt.

But the

circumstantial evidence recited by the State in support of the
convictions - i.e., the fact that Dunn drove the motorhome away
from the gas station at a high rate of speed, the fact that
bullets matching the murder weapon were found in Dunn's duffle
bag,12 the fact that when initially stopped by Trooper Larsen,
Dunn stated that the motorhome was a "drive-out" car from California13 - is entirely consistent with that defense.

12

The bullets were the subject of a suppression motion which
should have been granted. See Point IV of Dunn's opening Brief and
of this Reply Brief* Even if the bullets were properly received in
evidence, however, the fact that they were found in Dunn's duffle
bag does not disprove the existence of coercion. Other undisputed
evidence showed that Scott had stacked the duffle bag along with
several other bags against the bathroom door just before the
motorhome was stopped by the police and that the bullets were found
at the very top of the duffle bag. T. 263 and 277. There was also
some evidence that the gun belonged to Scott. T. 375.
13

This statement was made immediately after the motorhome was
stopped, before any backup officer had arrived, and while Dunn was
still seated in the motorhome next to Scott and may reasonably have
believed that Scott still had possession of the gun. T. 262.
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This circumstantial evidence is so slight and insubstantial
that a jury could not reasonably rely upon it to convict Dunn,
To "bolster" this evidence, the State relies upon the testimony
of Howard Scott.

A transcript of Scott's trial testimony is

attached to this Reply Brief as Addendum B.

A reading of that

transcript convincingly demonstrates that Scottfs testimony was
inherently unreliable and could not be relied upon by reasonable
minds to convict a person of a criminal offense.
Even the prosecution placed no credence in Scott's testimony.

The prosecution's direct examination began with the fol-

lowing admission:
Q.
In the past you have not always stuck to
the truth in explaining your story; have you?
A.

No.

Tr. 491.
Direct examination concluded on a similar note:
Q.
You didn't object to that [a purported
plan to drive to Denver to kill Sprinkle's
wife], did you?
A.

Yes I did.

Q.

0, Howard, you did not.

A.

Oh, yes.

Q.
You've told a lot of stories different
than that one; haven't you?
A.

I've told thousands.

Q.

You what?

A.

Yes.
23
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Tr. 496,
Cross-examination followed in a similar vein.

Scott ad-

mitted to several prior convictions, including at least one
felony.

When questioned about a statement he made only ten days

earlier in accordance with his plea bargain, Scott testified:
Q.
Do you remember giving a statement to
Mr. Brown in the presence of your own lawyer
on December 20th right here in the Courthouse?
A.

About what?

Q.

About the facts of this case.

A.
I don't remember nothing. I have other
things on my mind. Like No. 1, I've been
worrying about my grandmother.
Tr. 508.
In response to further questioning concerning the statement,
Scott testified:
Q.
Do you remember this question being
asked you on December 20th: "You're the only
one that even hit the Old Man; is that
right," and your answer, "Yes, hell, hell."
Did you ever say that?
A.

Me?

Q.

Yes.

A*

No.

Q.
What about this question: "How many
times did you hit him?" And your answer:
"Once." Do you recall that?
A.

No.
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Q.
Do you recall this question: "With the
gun? Right?" And your answer: "Right."
A.
Nope.
boys.

I'm just one of the good old

Tr. 508-509.
After Scott continued to deny,portions of his statement, he
was asked:
Q.
It's only been ten days ago, Mr. Scott.
Don't you remember that?
A,
Like I just told you. I worry about my
grandmother. I have problems of my own. So,
whatever happened then is completely out of
my mind. There's only one person I've got on
my mind and that's my grandmother.
Q.
And you didn't promise to testify in
this case?
A.

No.

I didn't.

I don't make promises.

Tr. 509.
*

Redirect examination by the prosecutor began with the following exchange:
Q.
About the only time we can believe you
is when there's something there in writing to
back you up; isn't it?
A.

(No answer).

Q.
You've seen quite a few doctors who gave
a diagnosis on you as a pathological liar;
haven't you.
A.

Yes.

Q*

It's hard to argue with; isn't it.

A.

It sure don't.
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Tr. 510.
On recross, Scott continued to deny having made a statement
in connection with his plea bargain.

Tr. 514.

Finally, the

prosecutor was forced to take the stand to establish that the
statement and the plea bargain had been made.

T. 517-519.

In so

doing, the prosecutor revealed his personal opinion that Scott
had violated the terms of the plea bargain by failing to testify
truthfully:
Q. You heard Mr. Scott deny the agreement
having been reached with the prosecution; is
that true?
A.

I heard it.

Q.

Is that true?

A. No. That's incorrect but it may be true .
now, however.
T. 518.

In closing argument, the prosecutor stated that "Howard

Scott would tell a lie at any time to make him look good."

T.

556.
Scott's prior felony convictions, his own guilt for the
murder of Sprinkle, his promise to testify against Dunn in
exchange for a guilty plea to a reduced charge, and his numerous
inconsistent statements concerning Dunn's involvement render his
testimony inherently unreliable to support a criminal conviction.
His obvious contempt for the judicial process and the oath of
truthfulness he had sworn, however, make any conviction based
upon his testimony an outright mockery of justice.
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Scott was so blatantly deceitful and contemptuous of the
truth that even the most trustworthy corroborating evidence could
not render his testimony reliable. . The State, however, offers
only the testimony of Thomas Gleffe to corroborate Scott's story.
Rather than corroborating Scott, Gleffe actually contradicted
Scott's testimony in two important respects.

First, contrary to

Scott's claim that he obtained the gun from Dunn, T. 494, Gleffe
testified as follows:
Q. And did Scott say anything to you on that
occasion about the gun?
A. He just said that he always carried it;
he always had it with him. That was his gun.
Q.

He told you that it was his gun?

A.

Yes.

T. 374-75.
Second, Gleffe contradicted Scott's testimony on the key
issue of whether Dunn had intended to kill Sprinkle.

Although

Scott testified that he shot Sprinkle at Dunn's behest, T. 49495, Gleffe testified as follows:
Q.
Did he [Dunn] also discuss with you what
they intended with Mr. Sprinkle?
A.
It was, at the time, just to tie him up
and take his money and let it go at that.
Q.
Did he express a little surprise that it
didn't work out that way?
A.

Right.

T. 395.
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In addition to contradicting Scott on material facts,
Gleffefs testimony was scarcely more reliable than that of Scott.
At the time he testified in Dunn's trial, Gleffe was serving time
himself for a felony conviction.

T. 373.

Moreover, Gleffe had

been incarcerated in the Sevier County Jail with Scott.

Under

the circumstances, Gleffefs claim that Dunn told him that Dunn
and Scott had intended to tie Sprinkle up and rob him is insufficient to corroborate the testimony of Scott.
Reasonable minds could not rely on the testimony of Scott
and Gleffe to convict a person of any crime, let alone one for
which he may be imprisoned for life.

Aside from the testimony of

Scott, the circumstantial evidence against Dunn is insufficient
to support his convictions.

The convictions should therefore be

reversed.
IV.

BULLETS FOUND PURSUANT TO THE ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF
THE DUFFLE BAG SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.
A.

Dunn Sufficiently Raised The Objection To The
Search And Seizure Of The Duffle Bag.

The State alleges that Mr. Dunn's attorney failed to raise
the issue of the illegal search which lead to the discovery of
bullets similar to those used in the murder.

In fact, during the

initial argument over the admission of testimony regarding the
bullets, it was the prosecution, not Mr. Taylor who framed the
argument when he suggested that the jury be excused:

"We intend

to introduce evidence, Your Honor, that the duffle bag belonged
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to Robert Dunn.

I believe this was the substance of one of Mr.

Taylor's motions so I'll just ask the questions of Officer Page."
T. 278.

After the judge heard the.proposed testimony, Mr. Taylor

argued to the court:
The first question is whether or not the
little discussion between Mr. Page and Mr.
Dunn on the 14th is a voluntary statement or,
if we have the Miranda come to play at that
point in time, and I believe that the other
question would be whether or not the discovery of that stuff in the Sheriff's Office
later is a plain view situation. I don't
think it comes under the warrant and I recognize that probable merit on the issues and
I'm not going to belabor it at this point but
I am going to object to the admissibility of
the statements between Dunn and Mr. Page and
the fruits obtained therefrom as being a
statement that the Miranda should have been
used to safeguard it, because it wasn't there
and can't come in and the seizure of the
duffle bag's contents, that show ownership of
the bag, as being outside the scope of the
warrant and, therefore suppressible.
T. 285-86.

(Emphasis added).

The court's ruling further re-

flected the Fourth Amendment issues raised In the objection.

The

court ruled: "In the Court's opinion the duffle bag was apparently picked up, in plain view, and brought back apparently to
the jail and apparently the Defendant asked the officer to go
through the bag and find him some medicine."

T. 286.

It is

clear from these comments that defendant did challenge the scope
of the search warrant and that the court understood and addressed
that challenge when it ruled that the evidence was admissible.
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(

The State's claim that this objection was raised exclusively
under the Fifth Amendment is incorrect.

In defense counsel's

argument to the court he never mentioned any specific amendment
to the United States Constitution,

He simply said that he was

not going to argue for suppression based on "a defective warrant
and affidavit."

T. 285.

Defense counsel stated that the conver-

sation between Mr. Dunn and Mr. Page should have been suppressed
because of the lack of a Miranda warning and also argued that
there was a problem with the duffle bag not falling within the
scope of the warrant.

In his argument over the Miranda warning,

there was no mention of the Fifth Amendment.

In his argument

over the scope of the warrant there was no specific reference to
the Fourth Amendment.

The court's ruling indicates that it was

clear that both issues were raised.14
B.

The Search Of The Duffle Bag Was Outside The Scope
Of The Warrant.

The State alleges that there is no support for Mr. Dunn's
claim that the search of the duffle bag was outside the scope of
the warrant.

In fact, as Mr. Dunn argued in his opening brief,

14

In addition, in the Anders brief filed with this Court in Mr.
Dunn's first appeal, defense counsel phrased the search and seizure
issue in terms of suppression of evidence. Brief of Appellant
filed January 20, 1982, p. 7. The issue was stated as, "Did the
trial court err in not suppressing evidence of bullets removed from
Defendant's personal belongings." Although this statement of the
issue came after the trial, it sheds some light on defense
counsel's objection during the trial and supports the conclusion
that Mr. Dunn's objection to the search of the duffle bag was not
waived.
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the search and seizure of the duffle bag exceeded the State's
authority under the warrant.

A search warrant does not give

police the authority to seize every object within the area being
searched.

Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2307-08 (1990);

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-71 (1971).

While

the police in this case had a warrant to search the motorhome,
they had no authority to seize every object within the motorhome
whether it constituted evidence or not.

The removal of the

duffle bag from the motorhome and the subsequent search at the
police station constituted a search and seizure outside the scope
of the warrant.

"In the course of a legal search, officers may

make a warrantless seizure of objects inadvertently found in
plain view, if it is 'immediately apparent to the police that
they have evidence before them.'"

United States v. Hillyard, 677

F.2d 1336, 1341 (9th Cir. 1982) quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra.

Although the inadvertence requirement was reversed

in Horton, supra, the plain view requirement was reaffirmed.
Horton at 2310.

In this case, the search warrant directed the

police to search the motorhome for evidence related to the crime.
T. 285.

When the police seized the duffle bag and brought it to

the police station, it was not immediately apparent that it would
provide evidence in the case.

The separate seizure of the duffle

bag when its evidentiary value was not in plain view was not
pursuant to the warrant.

Thus, the trial court's conclusion that
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the duffle bag was in plain view is meaningless because the
unopened duffle bag did not manifest any evidentiary value.
286.

T.

The police had to open the closed duffle bag and two addi-

tional closed containers in order to discover the bullets. Thus,
the search at the police station was not within the scope of the
warrant and the evidence flowing from that search should have
been suppressed.
The State also claims that Mr. Dunn consented to the search
when he told one of the officers that he needed prescription
medicines out of the duffle bag.

In fact the officer's actual

testimony was that Mr. Dunn said, "Bring the duffle bag over, you
know, and we can get the medicine out of there."

T. 280.

This

was not an affirmative consent or even acquiescence to the
search, rather it was a limited request by Mr. Dunn to get his
medication out of the duffle bag.
The search of the duffle bag was not pursuant to the warrant
nor was it pursuant to Mr. Dunn's request for his medicine.

As

demonstrated in Mr. Dunn's opening brief, the search did not fall
within any of the other exceptions to the warrant requirements of
the United States and Utah Constitutions.

As a result, the

bullets discovered during that search should have been suppressed.
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V.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ADMITTING INTO
EVIDENCE A PHOTOGRAPH OF THE VICTIM TAKEN AT THE MURDER
SCENE.
The State argues that the trial court did not err in

admitting a bloody photograph of Sprinkle's corpse because the
photo was not sufficiently gruesome.
gruesome.

The State is wrong; it was

However, the reason the photograph should not have

been admitted was because it had no probative value.

A weighing

of gruesomeness against probative value should occur only after a f
determination has been made that a photograph has "essential
evidentiary" value.
1986).

State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752-53 (Utah

The State alleges that the photograph was probative of

the type of homicide which occurred but does not explain how the
photograph was relevant to this issue.
homicide was never at issue.

Moreover, the type of

The connection between the photo-

graph and the type of homicide committed by Mr. Dunn is particularly unclear in light of the fact that Mr. Dunn's purported
role in the murder was as an accomplice.

The photograph does

nothing to shed light on Mr. Dunn's state of mind at the time of
the killing or the extent of his involvement.

The photograph was

not relevant and therefore should not have been admitted.
Even if the photograph did have evidentiary value, it was
sufficiently gruesome to warrant exclusion.

In State v. Jensen,

727 P.2d 201, 203 (Utah 1986) this Court described the duty of
the trial court in admitting prejudicial photographs:

33
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That discretion is especially germane whenever the prosecution proposes to admit gruesome color photographs of the body of a homicide victim. In all such cases, the court
should determine whether the viewing of the
photographs by the jury would create a substantial danger of undue prejudice against
the defendant, and if so, whether that danger
substantially outweighs the photographs'
essential evidentiary value. The more
inflammatory the photograph, the greater the
need to establish its essential evidentiary
value . . . .
After quoting Jensen, this Court in State v. Valdez, 748
P.2d 1050 (Utah 1987), stated that as with any inquiry under Utah
R. Evid. 403, "the court must undertake a balancing test, weighing the photographsf essential evidentiary value against any
potential for unfair jury prejudice."

Even under the cases cited

by the State, Valdez and State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1989)
the test is still requires a weighing of jury prejudice against
probative value.

After reviewing the photographs in both Cobb

and Valdez, the Court found them not to be gruesome.

In Cobb for

instance, the Court notes "The photograph shows the victim's
partially uncovered body lying supinely on what appears to be a
clean surface.

Only the area between the thigh and chest (where

the two wounds were inflicted) is exposed.
face are not shown." Id. at 1125.

The victim's head and

Similarly, in Valdez, the

Court noted that the pictures were "not particularly bloody or
gruesome and were shown a large piece of cardboard in an array
that included nonobjectionable photos, thereby greatly minimizing
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the challenged photos1 visual impact." Id. at 1055.
The photograph in this case was both bloody and gruesome.
The photograph showed the victim's twisted blood smeared body and
blood soaked shirt next to the blood smeared toilet of the motorhome.

This photograph was significantly more gruesome than the

photographs found admissible in Cobb and Valdez.

More impor-

tantly, the photograph was not necessary to any issue the State
needed to prove at trial.

The State contends that the prose-

cution needed the photograph to educate the jury on the appropriate degree of murder.

In fact, the photograph of the bloody

corpse did nothing to distinguish the degrees of murder from each
other.

The photograph proved nothing about Dunn's level of

participation or of his mental state at the time of the murder.
The gruesome photograph had no probative value and should not
have been admitted as evidence.
VI.

MR. DUNN WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT
TRIAL.
A.

Scott's Testimony Was Uncorroborated And Dunn's
Counsel Was Ineffective In Failing To Request A
Cautionary Instruction To The Jury.

In response to Dunn's contention that the failure of his
trial counsel to request an uncorroborated accomplice testimony
instruction constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, the
State argues that Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7 (1980) leaves the
issue of whether to give such an instruction to the discretion of
the trial court unless it finds that the testimony is "self-con35
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tradictory, uncertain or improbable."

As previously discussed,

Scott's testimony certainly fits that description.
27, supra.

See pp. 23-

Aside from the numerous prior inconsistent statements

Scott had made concerning Dunn's involvement in the crime, Scott
equivocated so flagrantly concerning the statement he made when
he entered his guilty plea that the prosecutor was required to
take the stand to impeach his own witness.

T. 517-19.

The

prosecutor acknowledged Scott's lack of credibility when he
intimated that Scott had violated the terms of the plea bargain
by failing to testify truthfully.

T. 518. An instruction to the

jury to view Scott's testimony with caution was clearly mandated
by section 77-17-7.
The State further argues that section 77-17-7 does not apply
because Scott's testimony was corroborated by other, circumstantial evidence and by the testimony of Thomas Gleffe.
argument has no merit.

This

In State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah

1980), this Court discussed the standard for the corroboration of
accomplice testimony:
This Court has previously stated that the
corroboration need not go to all the material
facts as testified to by the accomplice, nor
need it be sufficient in itself to support a
conviction. However, the corroborating evidence must connect the defendant with the
commission of the offense and be consistent
with his guilt and inconsistent with his
innocence.
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Id. at 1167 (citations omitted).

Based on this standard, the

evidence was insufficient to corroborate Scott's testimony.

The

evidence neither connects Dunn with the commission of the crime,
nor is it inconsistent with his innocence.
The State contends that except for Dunn's involvement in the
crime, "all other aspects of Scott's testimony were not even
disputed."

State's Br. at 46. Aside from being incorrect, this

statement is meaningless.

None of the other aspects of Scott's

testimony either connected Dunn with the commission of the kidnapping and homicide, nor were they inconsistent with Dunn's
innocence.

Since the other aspects of Scott's testimony were not

even material, the only reason to dispute them would be again to
challenge Scott's credibility.

In fact, however, defense counsel

did challenge the collateral aspects of Scott's testimony where,
for example, he disputed Scott's testimony that he hadn't driven
the motorhome.

T. 500-01.

While Scott was not insane enough to

deny that he even shot Sprinkle —

a fact that was not only

undisputed but, under the circumstances, indisputable -- that is
certainly not evidence that he was telling the truth when it was
only his word against that of Dunn.
The State next claims, without citation to the record, that
"witnesses at the time of the crime viewed defendant and Scott as
acting in concert."

State's Br. at 46.

ported by the record.

This claim is unsup-

The only witnesses who testified about

37
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

events "at the time of the crime" were Michael Stolz, the hitchhiker who saw Sprinkle in the back of the motorhome, and George
Morrison, the attendant at the gas station in Richfield.

Neither

Stolz nor Morrison gave any testimony characterizing Dunn's
actions or demeanor.

T. 250-58; 355-62.

Trooper Larsen was the

only witness who ventured any opinion about Dunn's demeanor.

He

stated only that Dunn appeared "calm and collected" when Larsen
asked him for identification after stopping the motorhome.
263-64.

T.

This conclusory statement has little, if any, probative

value as to Dunn's actual state of mind.

Indeed, when Larsen

made his observation, Dunn easily could have believed, perhaps
correctly, that Scott still had possession or control of the
gun.15

Once outside the motorhome, after several backup officers

had arrived, Dunn made the exculpatory statement, "All I was told
was to drive."

T. 269-270.

Thus, none of the witnesses to

events at the time of the crime corroborate Scott's testimony.
The State also cites the bullets found at the top of/Dunn's
duffle bag as corroborating evidence.

As previously discussed,

the bullets should have been suppressed.
opening Brief and of this Reply Brief.

See Point IV of Dunn's
In any event, Scott

easily could have hidden them in the duffle bag when he piled the

15

Larsen also testified that Scott, who had shot Sprinkle only
moments before, was still in the back of the motorhome when it was
first stopped. T. 268. The murder weapon was later found under
the mattress in the sleeping compartment above the cab of the
motorhome on the passenger's side where Scott was sitting. T. 274.
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bags up against the bathroom door of the motorhome before it was
stopped by the police.

T.263, 268.

This explanation appears all

the more likely in light of Thomas Gleffe's testimony that Scott
told him that the gun belonged to Scott.

T. 375.

Thus, the

bullets also fail to corroborate Scott's story.
The State further relies upon the testimony of Thomas Gleffe
to corroborate Scott.

As previously discussed, rather than

corroborating Scott, Gleffe actually contradicted Scott's
testimony on two important points, including Dunn's intent.
pp. 27-28, supra.

See

In addition to being inconsistent with Scott,

Gleffe, a convicted felon and former fellow jail inmate of Scott,
was hardly more reliable.

To rely upon Gleffe's testimony to

corroborate Scott would be to build a house of cards too precarious to justify a criminal conviction.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any evidence sufficient
to instill a rational belief in the testimony of one who, in the
words of the prosecutor, was a pathological liar who "would tell
a lie at any time to make him look good."

T. 556.

The above

evidence falls far short of being sufficient to corroborate the
testimony of Scott.

Defense counsel was ineffective in failing

to request an instruction to the jury to view Scott's testimony
with caution.

39
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

B.

Trial Counsel's Failure To Request An Appropriate
Instruction On The Defense Of Compulsion Constituted Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel.

The State argues that there was no need for a jury instruction explaining the burden of proof as it related to the affirmative defense of compulsion.

Although there is no Utah case ad-

dressing the burden of proof issue in the case of compulsion,
this Court has addressed the issue of burden of proof instructions in the case of another affirmative defense.

According to

State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428-29 (Utah 1986), it was
improper for a court to give an instruction on the affirmative
defense of withdrawal without making it clear that the burden of
proof is on the State to show that withdrawal has not occurred.
Despite the State's claim to the contrary, Hansen mandates a
clear statement concerning the burden of proof.
Relying on State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989), the
State claims that a burden of proof instruction would have been
unnecessarily repetitive.

In fact, the State ignores a sig-

nificant distinction between the facts of Johnson and those of
this case.

In Johnson, the error alleged by the defendant was

that "instruction No. 11 explained the concept of reasonable
doubt in the positive as well as the negative and because
instruction No. 12 explained the concept only in the positive,
there was then a 'two-to-one imbalance' prejudicial to defendant."

Id. at 1146.

The Court in Johnson was specifically con-
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cerned with jury instructions that are one for one repetitive.
Although the Court noted that jury instructions must be read as a
whole, it did not address the specific situation in this case:
the need for a clear instruction on the burden of proof as it
relates to an affirmative defense.
In this case, the prejudice from the lack of a burden of
proof instruction was exacerbated by the prosecutor in his
closing argument:
Robert Dunn raises one question and you're
going to have to determine whether it leaves
in your mind a reasonable doubt. Robert Dunn
said that he was coerced and the Court has
also given you an instruction on coercion and
that Instruction says, "If he was engaged in
conduct because of the use or threat of imminent use of unlawful force against him."
What does the evidence show? The only evidence of coercion whatsoever is Robert Dunn,
his statement that he was afraid, that he was
scared. What's the best threat he's come up
with? The best threat he's come up with is
Howard Scott saying, "Keep driving so no one
gets hurt." Is that the threatened imminent
use? There's a good reason for having a
defense of coercion and there are many cases
where people do have in a compulsion that
they couldn't overcome. Ladies and gentlemen, this is not the case. This isn't the
case and we have no better witness that this
isn't the case than Robert Dunn himself.
T.552-53.

The implication of the prosecutor's comments, and the

instructions to which they are tied, is that it was Mr. Dunn's
burden to prove that he was compelled and that he failed to meet
that burden.
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It is particularly important that the court give a clear
explanation as to the burden of proof in the case of an affirmative defense since the jury may otherwise assume the burden is on
the defendant.

Hansen at 429; see Lee v. State, 655 P.2d 1046,

1047 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) ("we [hold] that where the defense
of entrapment is fairly raised by the evidence, the burden of
proof is upon the State to show beyond a reasonable doubt that
the accused was not entrapped and the jury must be so instructed. " )
Despite the State's claim to the contrary, it is likely that
a properly instructed jury would have found that the prosecution
did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Dunn was not
compelled.

Erroneous jury instructions on the burden of proof as

to affirmative defenses constitute plain error.
617 P.2d 573 (Haw. Ct. App. 1980).

State v. Carson,

As a result, failure of

defense counsel to request a compulsion instruction that clearly
explained the burden of proof constitutes reversible error and
was ineffective assistance of counsel.
CONCLUSION
The trial resulting in Mr. Dunn's conviction was replete
with error and, thus, the conviction should be reversed.

The

improper second degree murder instruction undermines the verdict
and leaves in doubt the jury's conclusions about the evidence.
Each of the other errors, the prosecutor's improper comments
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during his closing argument, the improper admission of Mr. Dunnfs
previous conviction, the trial court's failure to suppress the
bullets, the improper admission of a photograph with no evidentiary value and the trial counsel's failure to request jury
instructions on accomplice liability and compulsion prejudiced
the entire proceeding.

Because Mr. Dunn was convicted on the

basis of circumstantial evidence, the errors individually and
cumulatively improperly bolstered the State's case.
is that Mr. Dunn did not have a fair trial.

The result

If the court finds

that there was insufficient evidence to convict Mr. Dunn, the
mandated result is reversal.

At the very least, Mr. Dunn is

entitled to a new trial.
DATED this /2~ '' day of April, 1991.
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN
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T H E COURTt

Going *• tha Intent e l e a m t .

SI

MR. BROWN:

I think It 1 a probsbly coorobora-

TW*^" —^

6|

tlve o f vhat Howard Scott is going to say about M r . Dunn's

71

feelings toward the better off class o f persons and why

B|

they shouldn't take action against them to get their due.

J
)0|

T H E COURT:

Your position is basically it's

not relevant and might be prejudicial in some way?

Ilj

MR. TAYLOR:

It's prejudicial and inflanmator4

12|

It talks about dope and hope.

13

the jury.

14

but I still feel it's immaterial.

15

I think that would inflame

W e don't have any issue o f dope in this case

THE COURT:

I do say that.

I'm going to reserve ruling on

16

it and I'll have to see what develops when w e get to that

17

point, but at this point I won't rule on it.

18
19
20
21
22
23
21
2S|
26|

MR. TAYLOR:

Alright.

T H E COURT:

S o , I'm n o t making a ruling on

it, but I'll see the posture as of the time of the case
w h e n it's introduced.

So, I'm reserving the ruling on the

motion at this point, and that's N o . 6.
MR. TAYLOR:

N o w , the last motion, Your

Honor, is Defendant's Motion N o . 5 and it's for excluding
evidence o f prior convictions.
T H E COURT:

W e l l , vhat about it?

Do y o u

have any objection to this?
281
241

J

MR. BROWH:

W e l l , I think h e intends that I

n o t b e allowed to ash M r . Dunn, w h e n he's on the stand, if
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I certainly do object

235
I thlnV. it's obviously le*itinate grounds for lr?*ae'c*nt.

3

1

THE COURTt

Uhat about the rules?

MR. B R O W :

If the Court will indulg* M

t

I f d like to go through the rules and case lav on it. Tour

41

5
61

1

Honor.
THE COURT:
bit on this.

Vn

Of course, 1 checked a little

looking at Rule 55 which says, "Evidence

7
8

that a person committed a crine on a specific occasion is

91

inadmissible to the disposition to conoit crine as a basis

101

for inference that he committed another crime on another

111

specified occasion but such evidence is admissible when

12

relevant to prove some other material fact including the

13

absence of mistake or actual motive offered, intent, pre-

14

paration, plan, knowledge, or amenities. M
By this rule it would seem to me at this

15
16

point that it 9 a not admissible. So, I come back to you.

17

What is the basis that you claim that it's admissible?
MR. BROWN:

18

Well, the basis I would claim

19

admissibility is when Mr. Dunn takes the stand and pro-

20

fesses to be 111) white, I should be allowed to introduce

211

that as part of his character for truth and veracity.

221
231
21.1

2S|
26

*•!
•* I

THE COURT:

Alright.

MR. TAYLOR:

Oh, Your Honor, I agree if the

defense presents evidence of Mr. Dunn's good character,
then the State has the right to icpeach that by adrissible
evidence.

We f re not saying that.
MR. BROUW:

The mere fact that he takes the

stand as a witness allows me to use that prior conviction.

281
291

MR. TAYLOR:

Oh, no!

THE COURT:

But the rule says otherwise;
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doesn't It?

1 alci> cUecV.id quite a bit of t;tc case lav on

it and, of course, those are Unite*} states cases which
states, as a n cnc ral rule, that upon the trial of an accueep
person evidence of another offense, wholly independent of
the one being charged, is inadmissible,

tlov, there are

some exceptions that get into rebuttal but, as I see it -131. LROir.1:

Well. 1 don't intend to bring

this in ny case in chief, Your Honor•
on cross-exanination.

1 desire to do so

1 will a si; for a recess and go

through the case law prior to doing so.
THE COURT:

Does that satisfy you, Mr.

MR. TAYLOR:

Well—

THE COURT:

I kind of hate to -- if he juit

Taylor?
k,

brings it in and wants to put on the evidence, boom —

of

this prior conviction. I'm not going to allow it because I
don't think it's admissible and I think our rules say that
it is not admissible, but in the d.tentative. if your client!
gets on the stand and you paint him as a character without
blemish, you see what I mean, and it gets into that, then
I think the prosecution has a right to go into it and I
think he has the right.

But what I'm really saying is that

I can't really rule on that until I get to the posture--of
the case vhere it cones out, but if he's attenptinj* to use
it as evidence of the coumission of this crime, I'm not
going to allow.
Uow, do you follow what Ifm saying?
MR. TAYLOR:

I think I do, Your Honor, and I

do agree with the Court that that conviction can come in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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as to defeat, or^

i:Tccch or rebut in character, as evidence, if t!>e Ikfcnilar.t presents it.
THE COURT:
where we've got a problem.

That's right.

So, 1 donft see

An I wrong?

MR. TAYLOR:
But other than that, I think th^
should rule
Court/that it is inadmissible.
THE COURT:

That's what I think 1 said;

131. BROT.^1:

I think I'm going to have to

isn't it?

justify its admissibility whenever it occurs, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
gentlemen:

Well, this is the ruling,

That I'm not going to allow evidence of other

crimes in your case in chief.
it.

Now, that's the ruling of

As to what happens after your case in chief, I'D not

going to pre-rule on that because I don't know what's
going to happen and that's the basis of the ruling and
that is, as 1 understand it, the basis of the law.
MR. BROWN:
Your Honor.

Alright. We'll accept that.

How, we'll go one step further:
THE COURT:

I think the danger of the rule

is either that the jury might end up convicting him, not
on the basis of the crime involved, but on some prior
crime and I don't want to get into that situation.
MR. TAYLOR:
Honor:

I'd ask one thing further, Your

If, during the defense, Mr. Brown decides to

attempt to get it In under the character matter, I would
ask him to pause before he does so and exclude the jury and
examine out of the presence of the jury before it comes
out as I don't want it being blurted out.
THE COURT:

^Alright, It's the order that,
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when y*»u pc: to the ^nint L:, crc; t-w..-^.i'..Ml^;«, t;»Vw you
feci that become* of inportancc to you, you vill notify
31

the Court and ve vill get into it outside the presence of

4]

the Jury and I'll examine any law you have to sustain your

51

respective positions.

61
7

You 1 re certainly welcome to see the lav that
I have on this so that you can see the basis of my ruling.

8

9

1

131. TAYLOR:

Ok eh.

Your Honor, the only

other matter --

10

TI1E COURT:

Let me just say that there are

111

situations where it is allowed.

12

I've based it on the general rule and I understand under

13

all the courts which are based on the Utah Rules of

14

Eivdence of which I indicated but I just wanted you to know

15

that.

:

^

MR. TAYLOR:

16

I've given ny ruling and

J

The only other motion, Your

17

Honor, and I believe I mentioned that yesterday that I'd

18

like to do it during the course of trial and that is to

19

suppress and the motion that I have vill be a brief one and

201

vhen the point of the trial comes that the prosecution will

2)1

attempt to introduce that, I'll notify the Court and ve can

221

do that during the trial.. I think that vill save time.

23

1

THE COURT:

Do you vant to give me some ••

241

or tell me vhat it's about 9 so I have an idea of what I am

:M

being faced with?

261

about.

271

MR. TAYLOR:
I think the State will attempt
evidence the
Mil
to introduce into/ownership of a certain person's belorifclngf

281

Because I don't know vhat we're talking

of Mr. Dunn, some bap^age, a duffle ba£, contents of the
30

duffle bap, and ve vill object to that.

.

JL
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"Look for the papers or the transport papers to the
vehicle," and I still pretended to lo<uU for them and, if
I was telling the truth, he might kill somebody and Jump
out and so I didn't know whether to go on with what he
said until I could get a better chance or not, so I did
look around in the console area there, still looking for
some papers and I didn't know what to say or what to do
and I just told the officer, "I can't seem to find them,"
a:.d r.u siiJ, "leek ana in," and that's vhcn I settled d?vn
again and I did and I kind of looked up and I didn't see
the gun at that point.

So I —

Q

You looked up to see what Scott was doing?

A

I was looking down for the papers and I

glanced up, over the top of my glasses, to see what
Scott might be doing and he was just sitting there and I
didn't see the gun so I knew I was not In no danger of
getting shot.

So the officer, at that time, asked me to

step out and, when I stepped out, I was a little more
relieved after I stepped out because somebody was there
like a security blanket.

He was there, he had a gun, and

he could protect me if anything did happen.
MR. TAYLOR:

You may cross.

MR. BROWN:

Before we start, Vd

like to

have a hearing outside the_presence of^the jury for two
or three seconds.
THE COURT:

Ladies and gentlemen of the

jury, will you please go to the commissioners room andr
once again, it's jrour-duty not to converse a&ong yourselves about the matter.
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1

-I

(\7hcreiipiDi^-fehe—Jtnry l e f t the Courtroont after
which tijgntne^tuunwinc prnrf»pfUnss were had:)

3
4j

THEJCQURT:"

Let the record show that the

Jury I s out of^thff rouTrxoum aL t h i s time.

5

M^iROWT:"

Your Honor, I Intend to open my

6|

croa*-examijiatJLoi^bxTiue9tloH&

1\

felonies.

to prior

81

THE COURT:

What's t h e r u l e . Counsel?

*j

M?*. EROT!;-.

I b e l i e v e ur.der Che Bennett case

101

any witness can be required, to answer asto-whether or

111

not he has such a conviction and, i f s o , what the convic-

121

t i o n i s for*

131
HI

THE COURT:

What about i t . Counsel?

, MR. TAYLOR:- - Weil, the Court ruled at the

151

beginning of the t r i a l that i t can come i n i f i t f s In

161

r e b u t t a l of character evidence.

171

character evidence.

We haven't presented any

181

THE COURT:

What about i t , Cotsieelt

19|

MR. BROWN:

He doesn't need to present i t .

201

Any t i n e he takes the stand he can be questioned t o answer

2l|

regarding h i s prior convictions and t h a t ' s according to

221

the case s t a t u t e s .

231
041
25I
o6|

THE COURT:
the statutes?
MR* BROUtl:

29

I'm r e l y i n g on State v s .

Bennett and I have i t r i g h t here, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

2BI

Are you r e l y i n g on ~ w h a t ' s

§

I assume you 9 re relying on

Rule 21 under the Rules of Evidence?
MR. BROWtl:

Yes.
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examined 78-24-5 where Itfsays That the witness must
answer 78-24-9, where he has previdus^onvictions of a
felony.

I've examined Rule 21 of the Rules of Evidence.

I've jxamiaa* State vs. Bennett, 517 P2d 1029.
MR. TAYLOR?

If the Court is inclined to

admit it, I'd like to submit some authorities.
THE COURT:

I'm inclined to admit it at this

point, but I'll hear you.
::?.. TAYLOR:

I :.^v. citations. Your -o-or,

from eight cases, all jurisdictions that are reported in
the Pacific Reporter'System.

I have underlined portions

that I thought was applicable to this situation.
THE COURT:

You've underlined certain por-

MR. TAYLOR:

Yes. I have.

THE COURT:

Do you know if Counsel has a

tions?

statute under this?
MR. TAYLOR:

I didn't read the California

statutes. Your Honor, other than what it says in the case
law.
THE COURT:
mony is.

Ifd like to hear what the testi-

I'd like to hear you on that.

I'd like to know

what your questions are.
CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MIC BROWN:
Q

The first question will be whether you have a

in I in hjjiiiy i Hlnili I Inn

Mr. Dunn?

A

Yes.

Q

And what's that conviction for?
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Q

Assault with a deadly weapon?

A

Yes.

Q

Did that involve the abduction of a girl -MR. TAYLOR:

Objection, Your Honor,

It's

clear even though Utah hasn't addressed the main points
**-

that we have to decide here, it's clear in every jurisdiction in the country that the date, the fact of a conviction, the date thereof, and the name of the crime is the
linit co the evidence en crciibility.
TilE COURT:

Give me your authority, gentle-

men, give me your authorities.
MR, TAYLOR:

I'll refer to an article by

Ronald N. Boyce, probably the chief authority on evidence
in the State of Utah, therein he discusses both the
Bennett case, Rule 21, Rule 55, the other rules and other
case law and that's his conclusion*
TIIE COURT:

Give me your article, Counsel*

(Whereupon the Court read the article after
which time the following proceedings were had:)
THE COURT:

I don't see what you're relying

on, Mr. Taylor. What in this article are you relying on?
Is it what you've underlined?

Point it out, please.

MR. TAYLOR:

Right here.

TIIE COURT:

It doesa-'t say that; does it?

Your objection's overruled at this point.

Ask your next

question. Counsel. Your objection's overruled at this
point.
Q

And that conviction was for assault with a

deadly weapon which involved the abduction of a girl?
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Is .that correct?
Yes.

MR. BROWT:

That's the only intentions I

Intend to use. Your Honor.
THE-COURT: .. Alright. Dojou have anything
core youfd like to say?

.. —-~-

MR.^AYLOR:
ties.

*-"•—

Well, the Court has toy authori-

allow the questlotw-**rtnc the Jury back In.
(Whereupon the Jury returned to the Courtroom,
after vhlch tine the following proceedings were had:)
Q

Mr. Dunn, is it true that you have ~
THE COURT:

Walt a minute.

KR. BROWN:

I*g_.aarry.

THE COURT:

For the purpose of the record,

the record should JLndlcate that the Jury's In the box, they]
have returned, and you may proceed.
Q

Is it true that you have a felony conviction,

a prior felony cgai*crfon?
A

Yes.

Q

What Is that conviction?

A

Assault with a deadly weapon.

Q

Did that assault with a deadly weapon pertain

to abduction of a girl in California?
A

Yes, it did.

Q

When did that take place?
MR. TAYLOR:

Objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Your objection9s overruled.
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ww

« « i«—
tor.tatt.1.

duly

bJ th

* " ' " °£

h.vlo6 b « ~

£ i r

"

w o t . t o t . l l t h . truth, t h .

„hol. truth, mi - t h i n s but t h . truth
•

took t h . —

— «

-

t

"tlUe<l

as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BROWN:
Q

Scate your

n:^.

X

Howard S c o t t .

,

«h«r. -r. Tou l o = a t . d - . * . Scott,

A

Sevier County JailHave you been there since August 14th?

Q
A
Q

Yes.
You realize you're under oath this afternoon;

don't you, Mr. Scott?
A

Yes.

Q

You realise you're going to tell the truth;

don't you?

A

Yes.

Q

In the past you have not always stuck to the

truth in explaining your story; have you?

A

No.

Q

But today, you're going to tell the truth?

A

Yes.

Q

When you left from Nevada heading for Utah,

who was driving the vehicle after you stopped at Mesqultej
was Mr. Dunn driving?
A

Cone back on that one again, please.

Q

After you left that casino in Mesquite and
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headed £$•£ U'<*.••> -, *-r Dunn was driving the vehicle?

Q

£

ivv, ">>r inkle decided to go back and lie

down &nJ r;c t

sl:.e£; didn't he?

A

Ysx, he did.

Q

The*-, at corns point along the road, you went

back and hit him in the head; didn't you?
A

Yes.

Q

W.;y did you do that?

A

Dunn told me to.

Q

What did he say?

A

Ue said the old man had to be killed.

Q

Why?

A

Because he was getting on his nerves and

aggravating and trying to tell him how to drive.
Q

What did he say about how he was driving?

A

That he hadn't been driving the right way or

something like that.
Q

Mr. Sprinkle also said something that made you'

mad; didn't he?
A

He called me a few names.
Said you ought to go back to Africa?

Q
A

Yes,
That didn't make you very happy either; did

Q

it?
A

Wo.
Did you and Mr. Dunn have a discussion about

Q
Mr. Sprinkle's money?
A

Q

Yes.
What was that discussion about?
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A

He said he wanted t o take the old c a n ' s money.1
•*fWrwanted t o take I t t o o ; d i d n ' t you?

i
1

Q

1
1

Q

You weren't going t o t u r n i t down; were you? 1

A

No.

1

1

"

A

Not r e a l l y .

Q

Who t i e d Mr. Sprinkle up?

A

He and Dunn.

1

<*

Who p u t him i n the bathroom?

Q

Where did that take place?

A

Right there at the truck stop on 1-15, coming

1

north.
Q

So you stopped there at the truck stop or Mr.

Dunn did?
A

Yes.

Q

And the two of you put Mr. Sprinkle in the

bathroom?
A

Yes.

Q

Did you have anything around his mouth?

A

Had a towel.

Q

Who put the towel around his mouth?

A

Dunn put that around it.

Q

And subsequently nothing else happened until

you got to the AMOCO Service Station at Richfield. Utah;
is that right?
A

That's true.

Q

What happened at the AMOCO Service Station

or as you were leaving the service station?
A

Well, when we reached the service station, the

inside of the service station. I was inside.
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Okeh.

A t ^ g g g a n w/>«* outride calling the hitch hiker.
I come out. Dunn ran back inside to the old man who was
coming out of the bathroom and shoved the old man back in
and I got back in the motor home and took off and. Dunn
•aid. "Well, the Old Han's got to be killed," and if you
don't, then he was going to do it.
Q

When you took off. Dunn was driving; wasn't

A

Yes,

Q

Where did you get the gun?

A

From Dunn.

Q

When did you get the gun from Dunn?

A

Well, he gave me that when the Old Man was

he?

laying down.
Q

Did you see where Mr. Punn got the gun from

before he gave it to you?
A

Out of his back pack.

Q

What does his back pack look like?

A

Well, it was a duffle bag.

a back pack.

I wouldn't call it

It was a duffle bag.

Q

Did you see him get it out of his duffle bag?

A

Yes.

Q

Why did he give it to you?

A

I don't know.

Q

When you left the service station, you shot

I was kind of curious about

that.

Mr. Sprinkle?
A

I'm the one who shot him.

Q

Why did you shoot him?
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A

2

Because Dunn said the Old lian had to be

killed. ' ",|aBI" '""

3

|

Q

Y o u xauat not have disagreed with that state

*l

meat; did you?

5

A

Yeah, in a w a y I did.

Q

Y o u atill shot him; didn't you?

M

A

W e l l , Dunn said w e had to.

*l

Q

What did you do with the gun?

""i

A

Tne gun was s-iLL ^uerr.eatn t?.a ^.i::rsss.

Q

W e l l , y o u put it up there; didn't you?

A

I guess so.

Q

A t any time in this whole thing, did y o u

I

6

|

#

threaten M r . Dunn?
A

N o . I didn't.

Q

D i d y o u order h i m to drive?

A

I ordered h i m to do nothing.

Q

What w e r e you planning to do w i t h M r .

Sprinkle's body a n d the vehicle?
A

W e l l , h e said, after that h e said, h e wanted

to go to Denver to get the Old Man's old lady.
Q
you?

S o . y o u thought she lived in Denver; didn't

Both o f y o u did. b o t h y o u and Dunn?
A

W e l l . when I looked at the picture, it w a s

in California. S h e w a s in California.
Q
But y o u were both under the impression she
lived in Denver; didn't you?

A
281
29|
J0.

Q
Denver?
A

Yes.
What were y o u going to do w h e n y o u got to

W e l l , h e said, h e said that after w e got to
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Denver, he was going t o the o l d l a d y ' s house, knock on thcj
door, t€TS29*r

the Old Man was back i n s i d e the note;:

3l

home i n the bathroom and t h a t he was s i c k and needed some

4l

help.

51

Q

Then what?

61

A

So, a f t e r she g o t i n t h e r e , I guess vtu would

7|

do t h a t , he was going t o k i l l her and take the motor
home down t o M i s s i s s i p p i , L o u i s i a n a , and dump that motor

j>

r.c~e ar^A ever/.r.lr.g in s c i e (^uick sar.i down t h e r e .

101

Q

You d i d n ' t o b j e c t t o t h a t ; d i d you?

Ill

A

Yes. I d i d .

121

Q

Oh, Howard, you d i d n o t .

131

A

Oh, y e s .

141

Q

You've t o l d a l o t of s t o r i e s d i f f e r e n t than

]5J

t h a t one; h a v e n ' t you?

\(A

A

I ' v e t o l d thousands. •

17|

Q

You what?

18

A

Yes.

]9|

Q

Are you t e l l i n g t h e t r u t h today?

20

A

Yes.

2i|

MR. BROWN:

I have no further questions*

CROSS EXAMINATION
3|

BY MR. TAYLOR:

nA

Q

How many times have you lied about this, Mr.

A

I don't count them.

Q

Many times; haven't you?

~.

A

I guess so. I don't count them.

.

Q

Right after you were arrested on the 14th of

Scott?
261

MM

August, you were taken down to the Sal ina City Hall and
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interviewed by some police officers; weren't you?
l

A

^l!*|ues8 so.

Q

Well, don't you know?
(No answer).
Do you know, Mr. Scott?
If you say so.
What do you say?
I guess I was.

I don't know.

W u vloa'u j«"ow if you ware ca'r.en to the Salir.a
City Hall and interviewed?

10

n

A

I guess.

Q

And everything that you told the officers at

12
that time was a lie; wasn't it?

13
14

A

It all depends on how you see it.

15

Q

You did tell them a lot of lies though; didn'tl

16

you?

You told them on that day in Salina that you didn't!

17

shoot Mr. Sprinkle; didn't you?

18

A

(No answer).

19

Q

Answer out loud, Mr. Scott.

A

I don't know if I did or not.

Q

And you told them that you didn't tie Mr.

20
21

I

Sprinkle up; didn't you?

22
23

A

I don't remember.

Q

And you told them that you didn't hit Mr.

24
25
26

28
2<*

Sprinkle; didn't you?
A

Still don't know.

Q

And as recently as December 20th of this year,!

you changed your story and said you did tie him up;
didn't you?
A

I don't remember.

\Q
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Q

You told Jerry Ilice of the Sheriff 8 Depart-

1

ment ori Augfclr14th that you %.c^e u~* one that tied Mr.

1

Sprinkle; didn't you?

I

A

1 still don't remember.

1

Q

You are testifying here today because you

I

promised to testify; didn't you?

A

1
'
"

Q

I promised?
Yes.

'
Q

You don't?

A

1 didn't promise nobody.

Q

You didn't promise anybody?

A

Ho.

Q

Nobody?

A

No.

Q

Do you recall having been tried a couple of

weeks ago?
A

Yes. 1 was tried.

Q

And do you recall the jury getting hung on the

murder count?
A

So what?

That's the Jury.

Q

And you recall making a deal with the prose-

cution after that; don't you?
A

I didn't make nothing.

Q

Well, you didn't?

A

1 didn't make it.

Q

Didn't you promise to testify for the State

if they would reduce the charge to Second Degree Murder?
A

Ho.

Q

Oh, you didn't promise that?
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\

\

J

A

No.
Q - ^ . W t y o u promised to plead "Guilty" to a

reduced charge and testify for the State if they would

3

reduce it; didn't you?

4
5

A

Ho.

6

Q

What did you promise them?

7

A

i ain't promised them nothing.

Q

Why did you hit Mr. Sprinkle in the first

A

Me?

Q

Yes.

10
11

I can't answer that question.

A

12

Do you recall giving a statement to the Sevier!
Q
County Sheriff, to the law enforcement officers on 1980.

13
14

when this question was asked of you?

"What did he do

15
when you were p,oing through the mountains that antagonized!
16
you so you hit him/' and do you recall your answer?
17
"So he kept on aggravating, aggravating,
18
aggravating.
19

I told him,

I said, 'Mr., look. I

appreciate what you're doing for me and everything

30
but don't keep aggravating.'"
21
Do you recall making that statement?
A

No.

Q

Do you recall this question:

23
24[

"Okeh.

So he was saying things like that and

251
then you hit him?"
261
And your answer was:
•V'

"Yeah, 1 did hit him."
28
2^

Do you recall that?
A

No.
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9

1

Do you recall givinp, that statenent to the

law enforuiSRil officials on the 14th oi Aubu**t?

1

A

No.

Q

Do you recall this question being put to you

on August 14, 1980:
"Now, when you tied him up, did you put him
in the bathroom at that time?"

1

And your answer was:

1

"Yes , I iii .'"
Do you recall having said that, Mr. Scott?

1

A

No.

Q

You do admit that you shot him though ; don't

A

Yes.

Q

You admit that you shot Mr. Sprinkle; don't

A

I only did it because Dunn said so.

Q

Do you always shoot people because someone

you?

you?
-

1
J

else says so?

I

I

A

I'm a sick man.

1

Q

You're a sick man?

1

A

I'm a sick man in the head.

1

Q

How sick are you?

1

A

Mighty sick.

I can't read.

See, I don't have an education.

I can't spell and can't count.

Q

Do you have a driver's license?

A

I don't even have a driver's license.

I've

never had one in my whole life.
9

A

Didn't you drive that motor home?
Veil, from the gambling casino to the gas
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station and back and that's it.
Q

*a5SBiryou recall saying to law enforcement offi-

cials on August 14th that, "The Old Man laid down and went
to sleep and I did a little driving?"
A

Mo.

Q

Didn't you do a l i t t l e driving after the Old

Man l a i d down and went to sleep?
. A
Q

No.
L - c y:i

sriii

Z\.J.Z

tr> 1 : v a r . f c r c c r i s r . t

officers

on the 14th of August?
A

I told you I l i e .

Q

How much do you lie?

A

How much?

Q

Yes.

A

1 don11 even know.

Q

Do you recall these questions and these

answers when you were interviewed on the 14th of August:
"Is that where the shooting took place?"
"A

Oh, it took place about five miles

"Q

Five miles back is where the Old Man

back.

was shot?
"A

Yes.

"Q

Now, who was driving at that time?

"A

I was driving."

Do you recall telling the law enforcement officials
you were driving when the Old Man was shot?
A

No.

Q

But you did tell them that; didn't you?

A

No.
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Q

Do you know a fellow by the name of Thomas

GleffeT^M^^
A

Thomas who?

Q

Gleffe?

A

Wo.

Q

Do you recall telling Thomas Gleffe in the

Jail within two or three days after you were arrested that|
the fun was yours?
A

*>

Q

You didn't tell him that?

A

No.

Q

You said a minute ago that the gun came out

of the back pack; isn't that true?
A

It was.

Q

Mr. Dunn doesn't own a back pack; does he?

A

I call a duffle bag a back pack.

It's all the

same thing to me.
Q

But it'8 really a back pack; wasn't it?

A

What?

Q

Where the gun came out of?

A

Ho.

Q

That was a clip of the tongue; wasn't it?

A

Yes.

Q

It really came out of your back pack; didn't

A

Ho.

Q

It didn't come out of Mr. Dunn's duffle bag;

*t?

did It?
A

Yes.

Q

You know Creston Sickels; don't you?
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mx

„

, A
. Q

Uho?
^JaWtston S i c k e l s ?

A

Yes.

Q

You met him in the jail a number of times;

did you not?
A

Yes.

Q

You told Creston Sickela that Dunn had nothing

to do with the Old Man; didn't you?
A

!.:, I nL:\'z

ZDII

hin that.

Thi-'s cr.e you're

making up.
Q

I haven't made anything up, Mr. Scott.

A

Uh-huh.

Q

When you were gambling at Mesquite with Mr.

Sprinkle, whose money were you gambling on?
A

He gave me a few dollars.

Q

Did you ever cash any chips in?

A

1 cashed in a couple.

Q

A couple of dollars?

A

That's right.

Q

Did you put the change in your pocket or did

you give it back to Mr, Sprinkle?
A

1 put it in my pocket.

Q

How many times?

A

Once.

Q

One time?

A

Yes.

Q

How many dollars did you estimate you put in

your pocket?
A

I don't know right offhand.

Q

$2.00?
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A
Q
- A
Q

,1 don't know right offhand.
^ B R ; many times did you cash in chips?
Once.
One time?

Why didn't you give the money backj

to Mr. Sprinkle when you cashed the chips in?
A

He gave me the chips, he gave me a couple of

dollars to gamble with and he told me whatever I win I
could stick that in my pocket and that's what I did.
Q

That's :'.;>. ;o:al yoa cashed ir., huh, v2."3?

A

Right.

Q

And when you left the Western Village Casino

in Mesquite, did you still have the $2.00?
A

Yes.

Q

And that'8 what you had in your pocket?

A

That'8 what I had in my pocket?

Q

Yes.

A

When?

Q

When the Western Village Casino in Mesquite,

Nevada?
A

I had a little bit more in my pockets.

Q

How much?

A

About $11.00.

Q

$11.00?

A

0r~12, I don't know exactly.

Q

Where did you get the money?

A

Where did I get the money?

Q

Yes.

A

I was gambling In Las Vegas too.

Q

Oh, you won?

A

• Sure, I won some money.
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How much?
^ W o n ' t knuj.

Q

$2.00?

A

1 don't know hov miir.li i t was.

Q

I t wasn't « t a l l i c a ; was i t ?

A

I f i t wafc e m i l l i o n , 1 wouldn't even be here.

Q

How much did you win?

A

I don't know.

were arrested?
A

1 don't even know.

Q

About how much?

A

I don't know.

I haven't had any money since

I've been in jail so I don't know.
Q

Where did you get the money that you used to

buy the gas to fill up the motor home in Mesquite?
A

The Old Man told me to RO in and inside the

motor home, in there, there was a hundred dollar bill to
fill one tank up.

That's what I filled up and I gave him

the change.
Q

Gave who the change?

A

I gave the Old Man the change.

Q

How much change was it?

A

About §50.00 — $75.00.

Q

Didn't you have approximately $30,00 on you,

when you were arrested?
A

I don't know.

I might have.

Q

Did you get that money out of Mr. Sprinkle's

pocket after you shot him?
A

Hope.
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1

Q

21

A
q

3
il

'.niere did i t cone from?
m't know how much money I had.
Have you been convicted of a felony. Mr.

Scott?

sl
J

A
Q

71

Once.
or twice?

How many times have you been

convicted of a felony?

ol

A

Once that I know of.

A
%

\:':\it

10

A

Auto theft,

11

Q

Where at?

A

ColoradoI

Q

Were you convicted of Armed Robbery in New

12
13

'-as Chat?

York on two occasions?

U
15
16

17

A

Not that I can remember of.

Q

Were you convicted of Auto Theft in Baltimore,

Maryland in 1969?

18|
19|
20

A
Q

Yes,
Shcplifting in Balitmore, Maryland in 1970?

A

Yes.

Q

21

Larceny in Baltimore, Maryland?
MR. BROWN:

22

1

. I object, Your Honor.

I don't

think we're limiting these felonies and I doubt that shop-

23

24|
'

lifting is a felony in Baltimore, Maryland.
THE COURT:

It's already in, Counsel.

MR. BROWN:

I know but he's claiming he

25
26

cotmitted felonies in Baltimore, Maryland.
THE COURT:

But it's already in.

MR. BROWN:

But if he's going to continue

28
2<*
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